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ABSTRACT 
CANADIAN IPO SHARE RELEASES: LOCKUP DESIGNS, TRANSPARENCY AND 
MARKET BEHAVIOR 
Siyi Liang 
Since no Canadian evidence exists on Canadian IPO lockups, this thesis examines the 
design, impact and market behavior of two types of lockups for Canadian IPOs listed on the TSX 
during the 1997-2005 period. We find that the existence of lockup information in an issuer's 
prospectus does not significantly reduce IPO underpricing by underwriters. We also find that IPO 
firms with dual-class share structures tend to have higher proportions of shares locked up and 
longer escrow lockup periods, and that larger firms have higher proportions of shares locked up 
as "escrow shares". These findings partially support the evidence reported by Brau et al. (2005) 
that firms with less transparency will provide a signal that the interests of their insiders are better 
aligned with outside investors by including lockups in their prospectuses. Significant negative 
(cumulative) abnormal returns are found only for high-tech firms immediately around unlock 
days. Lower abnormal trading volumes and relative spreads are found after unlock days for only 
the sample of IPOs with escrow lockups with stipulated non-zero lockup length. 
Keywords: IPO, lockup, escrow, abnormal market behavior. 
JEL Classification: G10, G15. 
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CANADIAN IPO SHARE RELEASES: LOCKUP DESIGNS, TRANSPARENCY AND 
MARKET BEHAVIOR 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Many firms undertake IPOs to obtain financial support from the outside market when 
expanding their businesses. Consequently, protection of outside shareholders from 
appropriation from insiders is a hotly debated issue given the information asymmetries 
between insiders and outsiders that favor the former. Most of the previous research has 
examined the efficiency of various corporate governance tools for firms whose stocks already 
trade publicly. 
The literature on the tools used to restrict insiders from exploiting outside investors after 
firms go public is not extensive. Ofek and Richardson (2000) find that existing shareholders, 
or insiders, usually issue about 15-20% of the total shares outstanding during their IPOs. As a 
result, insiders who maintain significant holdings of shares post-IPO need to signal to the 
public that their interests are aligned with those of the new shareholders. Share lockups are 
one of the devices by which existing shareholders can convey such intentions to new 
investors. Brau, Lambson, and McQueen (2005) find that firms with higher degrees of 
transparency (i.e., with lower information asymmetry between insiders and the public market) 
tend to have shorter lockup periods. Brav and Gompers (2003) find evidence supporting the 
commitment theory where lockups serve as commitment devices to overcome moral hazard 
problems subsequent to the IPOs. 
To our knowledge, no study examines share lockups for Canadian IPOs where both 
lockup and escrow agreements are used to restrict share transfers post-IPO for specified 
periods of time for specified pre-IPO investors. Furthermore, not only is the role of 
overallotment options for IPOs markedly different in Canadian versus U.S. markets (Chung et 
al., 2000) but the first-day mean returns for Canadian IPOs also are among the smallest of any 
country where formal studies have been conducted (e.g., Kryzanowski et al., 2007; Jay 
Ritter's website at http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/Int.pdf). 
l 
Given this deficiency in the literature, this thesis focuses on examining whether share 
lockups for firm IPOs serve as one of the ways to signal that insider interests are aligned with 
those of outside investors. Thus, the objectives of this thesis are five-fold. The first objective 
is to examine if IPO underpricing is related to the existence of lockup provisions in IPO 
prospectuses and to the lengths of the lockup periods. The second objective is to determine 
whether the design of share lockups in terms of lockup proportions and lengths are related to 
measures of the relative transparency of IPO firms. The third objective is to examine the 
market behavior of firms with different share lockups and degrees of transparency around 
lockup expirations. The fourth objective is to identify the determinants of any abnormal 
market behavior.of firms with different share lockups and degrees of transparency around 
lockup expirations. The fifth and final objective is to examine the behavior of trading volumes 
and bid-ask spreads around IPO unlock days. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In the next section, the literature on 
share lockup expiries for firm IPOs is briefly reviewed. In the third section, some descriptive 
information on share lockups for Canadian IPOs is presented. In the fourth section, the 
samples and data are described. In the fifth section, the relationship between IPO pricing and 
the existence of lockup information is tested. In the sixth section, the relationships between 
each of the two design features of share lockups for IPOs and issuer transparency are 
estimated and analyzed. In the seventh section, the market price behavior around unlock days 
is examined for two types of share lockups for Canadian IPO firms. In the eighth section, 
possible determinants of market price behavior on unlock days are assessed. In the ninth 
section, the behavior of volumes and spreads around the unlock days are examined. The tenth 
section concludes the thesis. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many of the previous studies examine the efficient market hypothesis around lock-up 
expiration days and try to identify the reasons for negative abnormal returns (ARs) on and 
after lockups expire. For example, Ofek and Richardson (2000) find a significant decrease in 
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the stock price although the timing of the lockup expiration is totally anticipated. They also 
find that the effect seems to be caused by a downward sloping demand curve that is likely to 
be permanent. Brau et al. (2004) find a negative abnormal return around the lockup expiration 
date that they attribute to information asymmetry and decreased incentive alignment between 
insiders and outside shareholders. 
Some lockup studies test the effect of lockup expirations on market liquidity. For instance, 
Cao et al. (2002) examine three proxies for market liquidity and find that lockup expirations 
only improve quote depth and trading activity while having little effect on effective spreads. 
Bradley et al. (2001) find that negative ARs are concentrated more in firms with venture 
versus non-venture capital backing. 
Tolia and Yip (2003) classify IPOs into four categories. They conclude that the decline in 
price on the lockup expiration dates is only significant for those lockups that have first-day 
returns over 60 percent. However, they observe price declines about 20 days before the 
lockup expiration dates, not just around the unlock days. In contrast, Field and Hanka (2001) 
find an average three-day abnormal return of-1.5% centered on the unlock day. They are 
unable to provide a conclusive explanation for why the negative abnormal returns occur on 
the lockup expiration dates since the lockup expiration dates are known (i.e., fully 
anticipated) by the market. Aggarwal et al. (2002) build a model in which insiders underprice 
IPOs to maximize personal wealth when selling their shares at lockup expiration. They argue 
that research coverage is positively correlated with stock returns and insider selling at the 
unlock days. 
Espenlaub et al. (2001) examine IPO lockup expirations in the UK. They not only find 
(insignificant) negative abnormal returns on and around lockup expirations but also find that 
sponsor reputations act as signaling substitutes to lockup agreements. Bessler and Kurth 
(2004) study lockups in Germany and find that venture-backed IPOs outperform during the 
lockup periods and underperform thereafter. 
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3. SHARE "LOCKUPS" FOR CANADIAN IPOs 
Two types of "lockups" appear in Canadian IPO prospectuses. The first type, which is 
referred to as "non-escrow lockups" herein, is included in the "Plan of distribution" section of 
the IPO prospectuses. A non-escrow lockup refers to the time period after a company goes 
public during which company insiders and all or almost all other pre-IPO shareholders are not 
allowed to sell their shares in the market. Parties so affected usually include directors, officers, 
all principal and selling shareholders, and sometimes even firm employees. 
Typical wordings for such lockups read as follows: "The underwriters have requested that 
certain holders of common shares each enter into a lock-up agreement.. .to not sell that 
shareholder's common shares for a period of X days..." or "for a period of Y days after the 
closing of this offering, each of the former shareholders of XYZ Company, who retain an 
interest in the Company and the Company, will not, subject to certain exceptions, offer, sell, 
transfer or otherwise dispose of any common shares...". 
The second type of share lockup places shares into escrow. These agreements require that 
certain shares must be held, usually by a third party (i.e., an escrow company), and thus 
cannot be traded'or transferred for a period of time. Since escrow lockups are used for 
executive incentive purposes and as payment for property vended into the firm, escrow 
shareholders usually include directors, officers and venders of property (such as patents or 
mineral rights). 
The "Escrow shares" sections of prospectuses usually state the number of shares, length, 
and proportion to be released in each period of the escrow lockup. Typical wording is: "in 
accordance with X Policy, Y escrow shares will be subject to an Z month time release escrow, 
to be released in equal tranches at V month intervals...". The breadth of previous holdings 
locked up appears to be higher for non-escrow versus escrow lockups based on the data 
examined subsequently for our sample of Canadian IPOs. This may be due to the fact that the 
former involves not only directors and officers, but also all principal and selling shareholders 
in the company. 
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4. SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
The initial sample consists of 97 firms that issued common shares during their IPOs and 
were listed on the TSX during the period from January 1997 through December 2005.l Data 
regarding the IPOs are drawn from the Financial Post New Issues Database. Price and return 
data for these IPO firms are extracted from the CFMRC database. Information on the lockups 
and escrowed shares is hand-collected from firm prospectuses that are available electronically 
on the Sedar public company database from 1997. 
4.1 Sample of Share Releases from Non-escrow Lockups for IPO Firms 
A sample of 59 IPOs with specified lockup periods for non-escrow lockups is identified 
in our initial sample. Based on the summary statistics for this sample as reported in Table 1, 
the average lockup proportion after the IPOs is 55%. The IPO lockup lengths vary from 90 
days to 540 days, with 180 days being the IPO lockup length for 78% of the IPO firms. In this 
IPO sample, 27% of the firms are defined as high-tech firms, 15% of the firms have dual-
class share structures post-IPO, and 41% of the firms issue secondary shares as part of their 
IPOs. 
4.2 Sample of Share Releases from Escrow Lockups for IPO Firms 
Of the 97 IPO firms in our initial sample, 44 have the precise date of the lockup period 
for their escrowed shares in their prospectuses.2 Based on the summary statistics for this 
sample as reported in Panels A, C and D of Table 2, the average lockup proportion post-IPO 
is 33%, and the length of the lockup periods varies from 0 to 365 days, with a length of 0 days 
for 16% of the firms. The proportions of high-tech firms and firms with dual-class shares 
post-IPO are 30% and 20%, respectively, for this sample. About 27% of these firms issue 
secondary shares as part of their IPOs. 
When this sample is further restricted by removing 7 IPO firms with lockup periods of 0 
days, the sample is reduced to 37 firms. Based on the summary statistics for this constrained 
sample as reported in Panels B, C and D of Table 2, the average lockup proportion post-IPO 
1
 This is after excluding 95 firms with issue prices per share that were less than two dollars and 2 firms that are not listed firstly 
on the TSX. 
1
 This is after excluding one firm that has a lockup expiration date that depends on the level of future profits. 
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is higher than that for the unconstrained sample at 36%, and the length of the lockup periods 
varies from 90 to 365 days. Similarly, the percentages of high-tech firms, firms with dual-
class share structures post-IPO, and firms that issue secondary shares as part of their IPOs are 
also higher for this constrained sample compared to the unconstrained sample at 35%, 24% 
and 32%, respectively. 
5. DO LOCKUPS REDUCE UNDERWRITER UNDERPRICING OF IPOs? 
Since the lockup expiry dates are reported in the prospectuses and are thus known to 
investors at the time of the IPOs, we conjecture that the existence of a lockup may be 
reflected in the initial pricing of an IPO by the underwriters. In this section, we test whether 
IPO pricing is related to the existence of a lockup and its length. To this end, we test the 
following hypotheses: 
Hi: The existence of a lockup does not reduce IPO underpricing by the underwriters, if 
underpricing is present. 
H\ • The existence of a lockup does reduce IPO underpricing by the underwriters, if 
underpricing is present. 
According to Brav and Gompers (2003), lockup agreements serve as commitment devices 
to signal that the interests of insiders are better aligned with those of outsiders. As a result, 
outsider investors are more likely to perceive firms with lockups as having less information 
asymmetry. In turn, underwriters are more likely to underprice IPOs less when lockups exist. 
To test the relationship between IPO pricing and lockups, we perform the following three 
regressions: 
T' dayreturnj = a, + J3ti xDl+sj (5.1) 
where DY is equal to 1 if lockup information is mentioned in the prospectus, and 0 otherwise; 
1"dayreturn, =at+ fiXj xDx+ e, (5.2) 
where £>, is equal to 1 if the lockup length is longer than 0, and 0 otherwise; and 
V dayreturn, = at + fiu x Z), + J32i xD2+st (5.3) 
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where Dl is equal to 1 if the non-escrow lockup length is longer than 0, and 0 otherwise; and 
D2 is equal to 1 if the escrow lockup length is longer than 0, and 0 otherwise. 
Two types of first-day returns are used in tests of the means and medians for the various 
samples and for the regressions above. The first type of return is calculated as the first-day 
opening price minus the issue price, all divided by the issue price. The second type of return 
is calculated as the first-day closing price minus the issue price, all divided by the issue price. 
The mean and median values of the first-day returns for the various sub-samples are 
reported in Table 3. All mean and median first-day returns for all sub-samples are 
significantly positive. This implies that these IPOs are underpriced by underwriters. However, 
for tests of the above hypotheses, we find that neither the existence nor the length of the 
lockups significantly reduces underpricing by underwriters (See Appendix 1 for details). 
6. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TWO LOCKUP DESIGN FEATURES AND 
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
6.1 Hypotheses and Test Methodology 
Previous studies by Brau et al. (2005) examine the effect of various possible determinants 
on lockup length. However, our IPO samples have much less variability in their lockup 
lengths since more than 75% of the firms have an IPO lockup length of 180 days. Thus, to 
examine heterogeneity in the lockup decisions of Canadian IPOs, we search for possible 
determinants of both lockup length (LockupLength) and the percentage of shares outstanding 
that are locked up post-IPO (%Lockup) for both samples. Larger values of both of these 
lockup design features are regarded herein as signaling the use of stronger lockup protection. 
To this end, we test the following null and alternate hypotheses: 
HI '• The strength of the lockup design feature (either proportion of outstanding shares 
subject to lockup post-IPO or the length of the lockup period) does not depend upon 
information asymmetry. 
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H\: The strength of the lockup design feature (either proportion of outstanding shares 
subject to lockup post-IPO or the length of the lockup period) increases with higher 
information asymmetry in order to signal a greater alignment of the interests of 
insiders and outside investors.3 
The specific regressions run to test the first null hypothesis are: 
%Lockup; = a, +/? 0i +yt LockupLengthj+fj (6.1) 
LockupLengthi=a*+^* 6,i+ *^%Lockupi+f* (6.2) 
In (6.1) and (6.2), a, a*, y and y* are parameters; /3 and ff are vectors of parameters; 0 is 
a vector of five firm-specific transparency variables; and /' refers to IPO firm i. The first 
transparency proxy is firm size, which is measured by the book value of assets. The expected 
sign of this variable is indeterminate. The lockup devices are enforced more strongly if larger 
firms are considered to be less transparent given more complicated structures or are expected 
to be enforced less strongly if large firms are followed by more analysts and have a longer 
public history of performance than smaller firms. The second transparency proxy is book 
runner reputation, as measured by the market share of new issues for each investment bank in 
the prior year (as in Hanley, 1993).4 The sign of this variable is also ambiguous. A negative 
sign is expected if firms use book runners with high reputations to convey their firm quality to 
the public. A positive sign is expected if book runners with high prestige require the firm to 
lock up a higher proportion of shares after IPOs, and/or have longer lockup lengths in order to 
protect their reputation. The third transparency proxy is a high-tech dummy variable, which is 
equal to one for IPOs of firms with SIC codes starting with 357, 367, 369, 382, 384 and 737, 
and zero otherwise (Field and Hanka, 2001). The expected sign of this variable is positive 
since high-tech firms are perceived as being less transparent. The fourth transparency proxy is 
a dual class dummy variable, which is equal to one when a class of shares with superior 
3
 This alternative hypothesis is also known as the "commitment hypothesis". Results supporting this 
hypothesis may also support the "signaling hypothesis". Brau et al. (2005) show that the two 
hypotheses have parallels to each other, and they make similar predictions about lockups and firm 
transparency. 
4
 Information on book runner reputations begin in year 1999 and are available for 44 firms in the non-
escrow sample, for 20 firms in the escrow sample, and for 13 firms in the constrained escrow sample. 
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voting rights exists for insiders and is equal to zero otherwise. The expected sign of this 
variable is also positive since dual-class shares increase information asymmetry. The fifth and 
final transparency proxy is a dummy variable, which is equal to one when firms issue 
secondary shares during their IPOs and zero otherwise. The expected sign of this variable is 
indeterminate. The expected sign is negative if these firms are more transparent because they 
are more established, and is expected to be positive if such sales by insiders suggest a lower 
ongoing commitment to the firm. 
LockupLength and %Lockup are added to regressions (6.1) and (6.2), respectively, to 
examine whether these two lockup devices are correlated with each other. The expected signs 
of the lockup device variables are significantly negative if they are used as substitute devices 
for each other to convey commitment. 
The Pearson correlation statistics for various pairs of dependent and independent 
variables for the non-escrow and the escrow samples are reported in the upper and lower 
diagonal cells of Table 4, respectively. For the 59 IPOs in the non-escrow sample, all 
transparency proxies have their expected signs. However, only the dummy variable for dual-
class shares is significant, which implies that firms with dual-class share structure after their 
IPOs tend to have higher proportions of shares locked up. In addition, larger firms and firms 
issuing secondary shares tend to use book runners with higher reputations, which in turn 
require firms to enforce lockup devices more (higher proportions locked up and longer lockup 
periods). We also find that firms issuing secondary shares during their IPOs typically have 
book runners with higher reputations. 
For the 44 IPOs in the escrow sample, all transparency proxies have their expected signs, 
with firm size and the dummy variable for SEO firms being positive and significant. This 
evidence shows that larger firms may perceive themselves as having more complicated 
structures and thus enforce the lockup devices more strongly. Moreover, SEO firms have a 
greater need to use lockups to commit to the public since sales by insiders at IPOs may 
suggest a lower ongoing commitment to the firm. Consistent with the evidence for the 59 
IPOs in the non-escrow sample, larger firms and SEO-issuing firms are more likely to use 
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book runners with higher reputations. Not consistent with the 59 IPOs in the non-escrow 
sample, lockup length is significantly and positively correlated with all transparency proxies; 
high-tech firms are more likely to issue secondary shares as part of their IPOs; larger firms 
are more likely to have dual-class share structures post-IPO; and larger firms are more likely 
to issue secondary shares as part of their IPOs. 
6.2 Empirical Findings 
Results for equations (6.1) and (6.2) for the non-escrow and escrow samples are reported 
in Panels A and B of Table 5, respectively. Based on the equation (6.1) results for the non-
escrow sample (Panel A) for various combinations of the explanatory variables, the estimated 
coefficients for the dummy variable for dual-class firms remain significant in all cases, which 
is consistent with the results reported in Table 4. This evidence shows that firms with dual-
class share structures after their IPOs have higher proportions of shares locked up when 
compared to other firms. This may be due to the fact that the dual-class share firms are less 
transparent to the public because they contain insiders that have more rights over other 
investors. As a result, these firms have a greater requirement to display their commitment to 
other investors when going public. Larger firms tend to have higher proportions of shares 
locked up (only marginally significant in one case in Column 2). However, we do not find 
any significant relationship of firm transparency with non-escrow lockup lengths of the IPOs. 
(None of the F-values for the regressions are significant.) Thus, the lockup length for non-
escrow IPOs appears to be exogenous. 
Based on the results of equation (6.1) for the escrow sample, we find that firm size has a 
significant and positive relationship with the percentage of shares locked up in escrow after 
the IPOs for 44 IPOs in the escrow sample. Thus, larger firms tend to have higher portions of 
shares locked up as "escrow shares" post-IPO. In addition, the dummy variable for the dual-
class share structure after the IPOs is significant and has its expected sign in Equation (6.2) 
for the 44 IPOs in the escrow sample where the regression as measured by the F-value is 
significant. This implies that firms with dual-class share structures after the IPOs tend to have 
longer escrow lockup periods. 
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In both Panels A and B, we find a positive relationship between lockup proportions and 
lockup lengths, although the parameter is only significant for some regressions for the escrow 
sample. This suggests that the two types of lockup devices are not necessarily substitutes for 
each other. 
7. MARKET PRICE REACTION AROUND LOCKUP EXPIRATIONS 
In this section of the thesis, we test the following null and alternative hypotheses: 
Hi: Market prices do not react to the expiration of the lockup periods for IPO firms. 
H\: Market prices do react to the expiration of the lockup periods for IPO firms. 
Our expectation is that the market price reaction will be negative (e.g., Brau et al, 2004), 
and will be more negative for less transparent firms. The following market model is run to test 
this null hypothesis: 
10 
R,, = at + puRmt + p.AK, + X Y,p2J + eu (7.1) 
;=-io 
In (7.1), Ri't is the return on IPO firm / for day t; Rml is the return on the S&P TSX 
Composite Index on day t; at is the intercept for stock i; /?„ is the estimated beta for stock i 
for the pre-expiration period; Dx is a dummy variable that is equal to one from the lockup 
expiration date onwards; D2J is the event dummy that is equal to one for day j in the event 
window [-10:+10] and zero otherwise; and yv is the abnormal return or AR for dayy in the 
event window for stock i. The cumulative abnormal return or CAR for stock i in event 
n 
window [m: n] is calculated as X^V w n e r e m and n WQ days relative to the event date. 
The (C)ARs are reported in Tables 6, 7 and 8 for the non-escrow sample and its high-
tech and non-high-tech sub-samples, respectively. We only find a significantly negative AR 
on day 1 of-1.6% for the 16 less transparent high-tech IPOs (see Table 7). The CAR around 
the lockup expiration dates are also significant (and negative) only for the high-tech firms, 
which have a significant CAR of-2.5% for the window [-1: +1]. This CAR appears to be 
driven to a large.extent by the negative AR on day [+1]. 
11 
The (C)ARs for the constrained escrow sub-sample (i.e., the sub-sample in which IPOs 
with a lockup length of 0 days are eliminated) and its high-tech and non-high-tech sub-
samples are reported in Tables 9, 10 and 11. Once again, we find a significant (negative) AR 
on day 0 of-1.8% only for the high-tech sub-sample. The CARs for the high-tech sub-sample 
for windows [-1 :+l] and [0:+l] are highly significant with values of-3.4% and -2.4%, 
respectively. In contrast to the non-escrow (sub-)sample(s), significant and negative CARs 
are present during the event windows [-10:+10], [+2:+5] and [+2:+10] for the 37 IPOs in the 
constrained escrow sample. In addition, the negative CAR for the 21-day event window is 
mainly driven by the negative CAR after the unlock day. 
In summary, the evidence reported in this section of the thesis supports the third 
alternative hypothesis only for high-tech IPOs (for both non-escrow and escrow lockups). 
Thus, the Canadian results differ from those in the U.S. for the lockup design (namely, non-
escrow) that is more like that used in the U.S. 
The mean and median market betas are reported in Table 12. We find a significant and 
positive pu in all (sub-)samples. However, the market betas do not change significantly after 
the unlock days, and all betas are less than one. 
8. DETERMINANTS OF THE MARKET PRICE REACTION AROUND LOCKUP 
EXPIRATIONS 
To assess potential determinants of the market reaction when lockups expire, we test the 
following null and alternative hypotheses: 
Hi: Market price reactions around lockup expirations do not depend on firm 
transparency. 
H\: Market price reactions around lockup expirations do depend on firm transparency. 
The generic format of the regressions used to test this null hypothesis for CAR [-1 :+l] 
and CAR [0: +1] is as follows:5 
5
 Due to autocorrelation problems, lockup length and lockup proportion are not included as explanatory 
12 
CARi[;.] = ai+M + £l (8.1) 
where all the terms are as defined previously. 
The Pearson correlations between various pairs of variables for the 59 IPOs in the non-
escrow sample were reported earlier in Table 4. High-tech firms and firms with dual-class 
share structures have lower CARs and SEO-issuing firms have marginally higher CARs than 
other firms around IPO lockup expirations. However, when examining the statistics for firms 
in the constrained escrow sample, we find that only the CARs in event window [-1 :+l] are 
marginally correlated with the dummy variable for high-tech firms. 
The Pearson correlations between pairs of variables for the constrained escrow sample 
are reported in Table 13. Larger firms tend to use book runners with higher prestige and are 
more likely to have dual-class share structures after their IPOs. In addition, firms issuing 
secondary shares in their IPOs and those with longer escrow lockup periods tend to use book 
runners with higher reputations. High-tech firms are more likely to issue secondary shares as 
part of their IPOs. These findings are consistent with what was reported earlier for the 44 
IPOs in the initial escrow sample, which also includes firms with 0-day escrow lockups. 
When comparing the statistics in the lower diagonal cells in Table 4 and those in Table 
13, we find that the biggest difference is the correlation between lockup length and the other 
variables. When firms with zero lockup lengths are excluded (Table 13), lockup length is not 
correlated with any of the other variables with the exception of book runner reputation. This 
evidence shows that firms tend to have escrow lockup lengths greater than zero if they are of 
larger size, use book runners with higher reputations, are defined as high-tech firms, have 
dual class shares, or issue secondary shares in their IPOs. 
Results for regression (8.1) are reported in Tables 14 and 15 for the 59 IPOs in the non-
escrow sample and for the 37 IPOs in the constrained escrow sample, respectively. In Table 
14, the cumulative abnormal returns or CAR around lockup expirations are significantly 
lower for high-tech firms, which is consistent with the evidence reported in Table 4. The 
variables. 
13 
greater drop in stock prices for high-tech firms around unlock days may be due to the fact that 
high-tech firms are those that are more hard-to-value and are riskier from the market's point 
of view. When book runner reputations are not considered, the dummy variable for SEO-
issuing firms has a marginally significant and positive relation with CAR around the unlock 
days. This can be explained by the observation that SEO firms usually have longer 
performance histories and are more stable. The dummy variable for dual-class share structures 
has a significant and negative relation with CAR[0: +1] only when book runner reputation is 
present. 
When examining regression (8.1) for the 37 IPOs in the constrained escrow sample, we 
find that none of the regressions are significant (see Table 15). This implies that the market 
reaction around IPO lockup expiries depends on some proxies of firm transparency (high-tech 
and SEO), while the market reaction around escrow lockup expiries does not depend on any 
of the transparency factors examined herein. 
9. BEHAVIOR OF ABNORMAL VOLUMES AND SPREADS AROUND UNLOCK 
DAYS 
In this section, we test the behavior of abnormal volumes and spreads of firms in the non-
escrow and constrained escrow IPO samples for days in the unlock event window [-10: +10]. 
The hypotheses that are tested are as follows: 
H50 : The expiry of (non)escrow lockups for IPO firms does not significantly affect 
trading volumes nor spreads. 
H\: The expiry of (non)escrow lockups for IPO firms significantly affects trading 
volumes and spreads. 
To test these hypotheses, we use abnormal share volume and spread ratios, which are 
calculated as follows: 
Volume^,-MeanVolume^SO:-11;+11:+125] ,Q *•. 
AbnormalVolumeRatio.. = (." • U 
" MeanVolumeX-50 :-ll; + ll:+125] 
14 
Spread,, -MeanSpreadj[-50:-11;+11: +125] ,n ON AbnormalSpreadRatio,, = ("-^) 1
 MeanSpreadt[-5Q:-ll;+ll:+l25] 
where i refers to firm i in the (non)escrow IPO sample, j refers to day/ in the event window [-
10:+10], n refers to the number of firms in the (non)escrow IPO sample, Volume^ is the 
number of shares traded for firm / on dayy, and Spread^ is either the absolute or relative 
spread for firm i on dayy . Our benchmark period for firm / is based on the values of the same 
metric for firm i for the period that runs from day -50 to day -11 and from day +11 to day 
+125. Following Cao et al. (2002), we define the absolute spread as the difference between 
the bid and ask price, and the relative spread as the absolute spread divided by the average of 
the bid and ask price. 
Some previous studies find that trading volumes increase right after lockup expirations. 
For instance, Cao et al. (2002) find that the mean and median trading volumes increase 
significantly after lockup expirations. If insiders tend to sell their shares when lockups expire, 
we expect to find that the abnormal volume ratios increase after the lockups expire. 
The mean and median abnormal volume ratios for the two samples are reported in Tables 
16 and 17. The mean abnormal trading volume ratio increases from -0.28 on day -1 to 0.29 on 
day 1 for the non-escrow sample, and decreases from -0.28 on day -1 to -0.49 on day 1 for the 
constrained escrow sample. Although the abnormal volume ratio increases for the non-escrow 
IPO sample, the ratio on day 1 is not significantly different from zero. The signs and 
significance of the median ratios are not consistent with those of the mean due to the 
skewness in the volume data. 
According to Field et al (2001), the absolute spreads change slightly and the relative 
spreads widen slightly immediately after unlock days. In addition, Cao et al. (2002) find no 
clear change in spreads before and after lockups expire. 
The mean and median abnormal absolute and relative spread ratios are reported in Tables 
18 through 21 for our samples. The absolute spread ratios are only marginally greater 
immediately before the unlock days compared to that during the benchmark periods. The 
relative spread ratio is significantly negative on day 1, which implies that the relative spread 
15 
gets smaller immediately after the unlock days for the 37 IPOs in the constrained escrow 
sample. 
10. CONCLUSION 
To our knowledge, this study is the first to examine lockups for Canadian IPOs. To this 
end, we conducted a number of tests for two types of lockups commonly associated with 
Canadian IPOs. We found that IPOs with lockup information in their prospectuses and with 
positive lockup periods are not underpriced less at issue in contrast to the initial underpricing 
associated with the remaining IPOs. 
We find that IPOs with dual-class shares have higher proportions of their pre-IPO shares 
locked up in lockup agreements and have longer escrow lockup periods, while larger firms 
have higher proportions of pre-IPO shares locked up as "escrow shares". These results 
support the conjecture that IPOs that are less transparent are more likely to use lockups to 
signal that the interests of insiders are aligned with outside investors, at least for the lockup 
periods. 
Unlike previous studies for other markets, we find significant negative CAR around IPO 
escrow lockup expiries only for Canadian high-tech firms. IPOs that include an SEO have 
significantly higher cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around unlock days than those that 
do not include SEOs. The CARs around escrow expiry dates do not depend on any of the 
transparency proxies used herein. We do not find any pattern of significant abnormal volume, 
absolute or relative spreads around unlock days for the non-escrow IPO sample. In contrast, 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the sample of IPOs with non-escrow lockups with specified lockup 
dates 
This table reports summary statistics for the 59 IPO firms that have specified lockup dates for non-escrow 
lockups. The sample size is reduced to 44 firms for book runner reputation. 
Panel A: Summary statistics for four firm/lockup characteristics 
Firm/lockup characteristics: 
Lockup proportion after IPO 
Firm size (in CSOOO's) 
Book runner reputation 






























Panel C: Proportion of sample for various lockup period lengths 
Lockup length: 
Lockup length < 180 days 
Lockup length = 180 days 






Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the sample of IPOs with specified escrow lockup dates 
This table reports the summary statistics for 44 firms that have specified IPO lockup dates in the escrow sample. 
The sample size is reduced to 20 firms for book runner reputation 
Panel A: Summary statistics for 4 firm/lockup characteristics for the sample of 44 IPO firms 
Final IPO sample: 
Lockup proportion after IPO 
Firm size (in 000's) 






















Panel B: Summary statistics for 4 firm/lockup characteristics for the sample of 37 IPO firms 
Final IPO sample: 
Lockup proportion after IPO 
Firm size (in 000's) 




































Panel D: Proportion of sample for various lockup period lengths for both samples 
Lockup length: 
Lockup length = 0 days 
Lockup length < 180 days 
& > 0 days 
Lockup length = 180 days 













Table 3. The tests of mean and median values of first-day returns for different sub-samples 
This table reports the mean and median values of first-day returns for different sub-samples. In Panel A, the 
mean and median values of first-day returns for 80 IPOs with lockup information in their prospectus are 
reported and tested for statistical significance using t- and Wilcoxon sign tests, respectively. In Panel B, the 
mean and median values of first-day returns for 78 IPOs with non-zero lockup periods are reported and tested 
for statistical significance. In Panel C, the mean and median values of first-day returns for 59 IPOs with non-
zero non-escrow lockup periods are reported and tested for statistical significance. In Panel D, the mean and 
median values of first-day returns for 38 IPOs with non-zero escrow lockup period are reported and tested for 
statistical significance.6 In the three panels, Returnhs equal to (F'dayOpenPrice-IssuePrice)/IssuePrice, and 
Return2 is equal to (Is'day ClosePrice-IssuePrice)/IssuePrice. , and indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 
























































































This includes one firm with a tentative escrow lockup expiry that depends on future profit earned. We assume 
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Table 8. Abnormal returns for various windows centered on the unlock days for non-escrow lockups 
of non-high-tech IPO firms 
This table reports the mean and median daily abnormal returns (AR) for the 21 days centered on the lockup 
expiration dates (the event window) for the sample of 43 non-high-tech IPO firms with non-escrow lockups. The 
ARs are calculated using a dual beta single-factor market model that is estimated over the window of [-50: 
+125]. The table also reports the mean and median CARs for various multi-day periods based on the [-10: +10] 
event window. The mean and median values are tested using t- and Wilcoxon signed rank tests, respectively. , 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































d o^ r^ 
d • oo 
en
 































































































d i *o o^ 
ts
 


















d 00 r^ 
d TC 






















d m t--O^ 




























































































































d • 446 "^*
 




















































































































d o 00 • 487* 
00 












































































































































































































































































































© 1 970 
CO 











































































d •n • 4470** • 
CM
 
© © © P-CM i 9929** 
CM












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 1 O in


































































































































































































3 ifi P 3 0 f» 
3 a.
 
0 S H 3"
 
fi>












































































































































































































































































d O a i 5 5 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 i 00 b © H^ -J Vl UJ 


























































































































































































































































































































































































- IS I' *r o s I
 I o «1 
Table 12. The mean and median market betas around the lockup expiration dates 
This table reports the mean and median betas and tests of their significance prior to the share lockup expiry 
dates for the non-escrow and constrained escrow samples of all, high-tech and non-high-tech IPO firms. The 
table also reports the mean and median changes in the betas on and after the lockup expiration dates and tests of 
their significance for these samples. The mean and median values are tested using t- and Wilcoxon signed rank 
tests, respectively. , and indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Coefficient Mean t-value p-value Median Wilcoxon p-value 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 16. Mean and median abnormal volume ratios for the days in the event window [-10:10] centered 
on the unlock days for lockups for IPOs in the non-escrow sample 
This table reports the mean and median abnormal volume ratios and tests of their significance for each day in 
the event window [-10: +10] for 59 firms in the non-escrow IPO sample. The benchmark used is each IPO's 





























































































































































. r . Volume,, -MeanVolume,[-S0\ -11 ; + ll:+125] , . „ . c .. ., 
Note: AbnormalVolumeRatio = '- - • , where t refers to firm i in the non-
" Mean Volume, [-50: -11 ; +11: +125] 
escrow sample, and j refers to day./' in the event window [-10:+10]. 
34 
Table 17. Mean and median abnormal volume ratios for the days in the event window [-10: 10] centered 
on the unlock days for lockups for IPOs in the constrained escrow sample 
This table reports the mean and median abnormal volume ratios and tests of their significance for each day in 
the event window [-10: +10] for the 37 firms in the constrained escrow IPO sample. The benchmark used is 
each IPO's mean volume for the period [-50:-l 1 ; +11 :+125]. ' and represent significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 



























































































































































- r . Volume., -MeanVolume,\-50: -11 ; + l l : +1251 . . „ . „ . • ., 
Note: AbnormalVolumeRatio = '- - - , where i refers to firm i in the non-
" A/eanFb/u»ie,[-50:-ll; + ll:+125] 
escrow sample, and j refers to dayy in the event window [-10:+10]. 
35 
Table 18. Mean and median abnormal absolute spread ratios for the days in the event window [-10: 10] 
centered on the unlock days for lockups for IPOs in the non-escrow sample 
This table reports the mean and median abnormal absolute spread ratios and tests of their significance for each 
day in the event window [-10: +10] for the 59 firms in the non-escrow IPO sample. The benchmark used is each 
IPO's mean absolute spread for the period [-50:-ll;+11:+125]. ' and represent significance at 0.01, 0.05 



























































































































































i\j„,„. AbsoluteSpread..-MeanAbsoluteSpread.[-50,-l\;+ll,+l25] ,„!,___ 
Note: AbnormalAbsoluteSpreadRatio,,. = '- - - : - i , Where 
' MearU6so/ate5lBread([-50,-ll;+ll,+125] 
AbsoluteSpread,j = Askpriceu - Bidpricev, and i refers to IPO i in the non-escrow sample, and./ refers to day/ in 
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Table 21. Mean and median abnormal relative spread ratios for the days in the event window [-10: 
10] centered on the unlock days for escrow lockups for IPOs in the constrained escrow 
sample 
This table reports the mean and median abnormal relative spread ratios and tests of their significance for 
each day in the event window [-10: +10] for the 37 firms in the constrained escrow IPO sample. The 
benchmark used is each IPO's mean absolute spread for the period [-50:-l 1 ; +11:+125]. ' and 



























































































































































*j„t„. , , RelativeSpread„-MeanRelativeSpread.[-50,-ll;+ll,+125] , . , ) , . „ 
J\Ote. Abnormal Re lativeSpreadRatio = 2 - - : : : - > wnere 
* MeanRe/affveSprearfj[-50,-ll;+ll,+125] 
RelativeSpread, = (Askprice, - Bidprice^fto^Askprice,, + Bidprice,)), a n d ' r e f e r s t o I P 0 ' m t h e non-escrow sample, 
andj refers to dayj in the event window [-10; +10]. 
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Appendix 1. The relationship between IPO pricing and lockup existence and length 
This appendix table reports the relationship between initial IPO pricing and lockup existence and length. In 
Panel A, D, is equal to 1 if lockup information is reported in the prospectus, and is 0 otherwise. In Panel B, 
D, is equal to 1 if the lockup length is longer than 0, and is 0 otherwise. In Panel C, D, is equal to 1 if the 
non-escrow lockup length is longer than 0, and is 0 otherwise; and D2 is equal to 1 if the escrow lockup 
length is longer than 0, and is 0 otherwise. In the three panels, Retumlis equal to (f'dayOpenPrice-
IssuePrice)/ IssuePrice, and Return2 is equal to (Is'day ClosePrice-lssuePrice)/IssuePrice. The results of 
coefficient tests of joint parameters are also reported in each panel. , and represent significance at 0.1, 











































































underpricing and the length of two types 
t-value p-value 
2.76*** 0.0069 
-1.28 0.2048 
0.58 0.5662 
Return2 
Estimate 
0.0678 
-0.0280 
0.0249 
-0.0017 
0.92 
97; 94 
of lockups, 
t-value 
2.43 
-0.92 
0.82 
respectively 
p-value 
0.0171 
0.3606 
0.4155 
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